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May  I  bEJgin  by  nay'~r:c  hmr  :flattorcu and  hon<"1tcred  I  p;n  to be  here 
today"  I  boliovo  I  Pm  right  :i.~.  thinking that  tho  i>Jational  Assooiatio:~ 
of Ilri  tish Manu::'ac·tm·o1 c  l.S  ...  ·crty·-:::j.ght  yoal'3  old this yoa:.  When 
one  is as  young as  tho  Europo~n ~~cuncmi0  Conanuni ~y  - now  ~t~st  five 
yoars  old - :::'orty-·Pight  ~>oornf  1'.  vo1·~r  ';rca~  af;o.  0:!'  .ocur!Je 1  in later 
lifo  ono  s G3.rts  tal\-::"~1['  • bout  Tfi8l:  vf  fcr·i;y-eight  as  '1up··!'.nd-ccming 
young fallmvs",  bu~  1-10  i.r.  the  Cc..mr!luni ty  v"l.!lnot  d-:1  that  ;just yet. 
NE:wc.cthcloscJ  T'.IY  oub~Pct  tod::1.;t  io  o~18  that  spn.no  a  number  of 
generations. 
I  lTa<~t  to  tR.lk  aboui;  tho  pj.'Elsont,  thG  pas't~  and  the  futuro  of 
Great  Ill'itain 1s  :relativnG vritL  tho  European  Com:nurity, 
I 
First,  then,  the  ~ras~nt.  t·:c  11.ll  know  ~ onJ.;;  too well  - what 
happened. at  the  begin!'li!'lr;  of  this yoal''  uheYJ.  the negotiations for 
British momoArshj.p  of  tho  Cor.u,cor,  l'larke b  cn.mu  to  an  ond~  We  all know 
the  hopes  that many  poo:rJ e  on  both sides  0f  ·~~o  Cha!'lnel  had plaoed in 
those  nogotlatiOlH! 7  end  i.:1c  ':.i3a:rpnin·:cnent  "I'Thioh  they  noH  face~  On 
the  oircurnat::wcu»  J..n  which  Jlri_ ti::;h  !Tl.orn"ho:::-s:-,:!_p  of  th..:- Cor:uctuni·Gy  'H'as 
thus  pootponed  .L  havo  s:rokr.n  at  le:r,g'th  elRo~:herc;  r.no  it is not  1ny 
intention to  rcpoa~; uhnt  T  havc·  alroc;.d.y  put  on  r'lco-rd~  Ou:c  Commission, 
the  exl1cut:i.vo  bcG.;y  oi'  ti1o  Gc.i.lli:<"'n  iV~r>.J.'h:r~t  ~  >as  prod.unod what  I  hare  I 
m:J.y  3d.Y  '...8  a:;.  j_rr.pn.rtial  ~no.  obJCC civ<J  ropo~t on  tha  ~-rhol0  negotiaiiion, 
This  nhom:'.,  I  tLi"1k~  t:•1at  'ihilA  the  J3:~·uf:'sois  talks  'iTOH)  not  yet  on 
tho trink of  c0rr.plc..tP.  ":'.uccosf3 1  th.Jj wore  cortainJ.y not  on  tho brink of 
failure  ei. tr.or.  Bet  rr,o:r?J  t~  tho  pcJni;  in  to  sao where  we  stand today. 
Hhere  docs  the  C.:lffimUYJ.ity  stand?  Gr  c:J.th:Jr,  '1\LI'.t  is the  Community, 
whero  haB  .i.t  g0t  to:·  n.ncl  w;1~rCJ  is  i.t  c.oing'~  Be::;a,_w-J,  "by  ~.ts  Yery 
nature  'J  tho  Commur.i ty  canr.c.-1.  :::·cc..~··d  ::>til]..  Liko  tho  Red  Queen  in 
Alico  in Wonder] and.  it hc.s  to  koe::!  rTJoYinc-,  if only in  order  to  stay 
in the  sa1.1e  placr.~~ 
EssentiaLi.y,  in fact,  the  European  :Sconord.c  Community is more  than 
its nickname  "The  Common  Market  •:  ~uggoflts.  It iA  an  attempt  to fuse 
togetho:..•  not  cml;y  r;;arlmts,  l.::ut  naJcional  econo7tios,  3.nd  this with  the 
political aim  of  crE:JatLDg  no~ only  a  la.reor  and  hence  moro  viable 
economic  unit;  rmt  also  t:1e  prnctical OCl.Bin  for  u,1i ty in othor fields. - 2  - 4937/X/63-E 
I  sa.id  o,1ce  that  :rT.,.O  a::.· a  :1.0t  j_n  busil1css!  1·ro  2.r~  in poJ.i  tj.csn.~  '1iha t 
I  moa."lt  we.s  -~hat  tho  vory  A.CJt  of .ncrging 11.ational  ma:rkeiD  and national 
ooonomies  :ls  in  j_·~::..o:_:r'  1.  ::-olJ.tical  o,rJt ~  oincc  1iha·b  we  n.:~:·e  soaking +,o 
combinfJ  ir.  one  poll:::y  :'.s  th  ... ,  ::-ole  hitho:cto :plP.yAd.  by national 
Govern.tnemts  in dotorm;;.n:l.ng  "th0  cond:i.tio:l:J  1~·ithil•  vrhich  manufacture  and 
trade  take  plaoc~ 
Ta.r:...f:i:'r:J  £.re  Hn  obv:Lou'1  ox<.l.T!1:P.'-e.  By  eBtahli:.1hing  a  customs union, 
the  Common  Ma.rk.e+  countr.·ies  ~~rn  olin;inatir.g tho  tariffs  th3.~ used to 
separa.ie  them,  c:nd  ra0re:i.n,c;  blto  mte  single  tur::!..:ff  rounci.  tho  wh0lo  area 
their formm:  cepa:cfl.te  national  ta.;:oii'fs  vi:?-3.--"ia  tho  1:es·.;  of the world, 
Much  the  same  ... ..,  truo  of  q'.lotas  and  rj:.;  fo:L'uign  tracio :policy in  general. 
But  ;.:hu.t  is trno  ol tariffs ar.d  r,uotas  i:J  aloe  t1  u·;;  of  other things., 
The  movement  of  c:u.pi·tal  ant~  lab,-;u:..~  must  brJ  :Liho!'a.:J.ized  n.s  "W·ell  as  ti.1e 
movement  of  goods.  ~"ld a  chack must  bu  mainteined to snsure  that 
Governmen·i:;s  do  11ot  diYiG.e  ~he  commor..  market  "'.:i:y  moans  of non-ta.r:!.ff 
barriers  to  fr6e  oomp'Jf.~. tion such  as  f'xport  t:~ubsidies,  tax  discrirnina.tiol'l_, 
or  diff£:jrEmtial  trans:por-G  ra·~Gfl'  a,:r,d  that  fj_rns  do  not  divicte tt "by 
means  of :p:..·ice  rj nrs  or market-sharJ.ng  agrc~oments,  Nor is thie: all. 
If we  successfully  '\~)olish  cho  :ra~i0nal  compartments within "l"hich 
na. tiona.l  oconom:i o  pu:~ioies were  pu:c,;;ned ~  ~··e  mus·~ ultimately pool those 
policj.es in  Gomr.lU."'li t:y- Joj.ioies.  'Phi.::;  is 0bvic.•us  in  oa.ees  like 
agricu.l  tu1·o  and  -l:r:Jr.Gpor"':: ~  ~-~~L;;;!'a  Govornmon  t  9.lroady  in  to3rrenos ,rery 
largely,  at:.'fl. wi  tnc  sa  t~v::  "~orl!"  ()t'  - da:..•EJ  I  llay it? 
it is e.lso  t.t't<.C  Of  IT• any  l93f>  spcc-·cu~·u..Lar  f'j.olds  ~ 
Dr.  Poaching.  But 
in the  Community,  for 
li.notance.,  we  ~ro ::.mui<.L1g  Corm:!:.mi ty  yo~_i0i'3s  on  t:'uoh  matters as patent  laws, 
tax  sy'3toms~  tho  lUJ..O"l  on  •JC.lOUl:·ing'  i!.atto:.•s  ll' foodstuffs>  end evan 
bankruptcy laii"s,  UltimateJ..y;,  1Je  may  havf'  t.o  :mvo  common  monetary 
polio1.e.J  Qllcl.  a  c0mMon  oconom~.c :>lolicy ir, general. 
So  t~e t:1sk  c.f  "buj.lding  ·~he  Common  li!a:r·!~ot  is not  just  OCC'lnomic. 
But it would be  equ·:~.ll~·  m~.slaadi.ng "!;o  cn.ll  H  "political" if this word 
were  used t" donote  sc-mothing  d.icta-torie.l,  ovor-cantral~  zed~ 
technocra'tio  and  doctr-ina~.re  ~ 
In the first place1  the  whole  proo~ss is gredual,  flezible  and 
difficult.  It nus  t•1  be  ir-:-evo~·si  ble  ~  of  course)  if only for the 
reason that  no  ono  would maki3  o'l1,8  no1-r  il').vostmonts  appropriate  to  a 
la.rgor ma!'ket  if he  fear0d that  i-1:  might  not ma:torialize,  or might not - 3  - 4937/X/63-E 
last.  Ilut  the  p:-ocoss  of adapta.-b:l.on  must  c.lao  bo  g1·adual:  indeed, 
the European  In-.rostm.:m~;  13e.nk  and  the  European Social Fund  ·.~ere  sat up 
:precisely to aid those  firms~ rogio:-1s  r.nd  workars who  might  find 
adaptation difficult,.  And 7  of  oo11L'So,  the  Common  r.larkot T:reaty is riddJsi 
with special safoguarda that  .::an  be  jnvoked by e:ny  membor  country that 
needs  a  temporary broathing-spaco  +-o  assist 'the  proooss  of  change.  All 
this  means~  as  I  ae.y,  that  the process  :!.s  not easy.  It is easy to set 
a.  firm  timota.ble  for ta.riff-cuttingz  i't is virtually impossible  to do 
the  same  for,say1  tho  co-ordination of monetary  policies~  Moreover, 
the  essonca  of  dumocra.oy  is pornuasion,  not  foroo:  and  in a  sensa, 
every timo  the  Community  gets into dii'ficul  ties in ibs  attempt at 
economic  union,  this is a  further proof that it is not  some  kind of 
dictatorship. 
That,  lndoed,  is why  the  Com~unity neod~ a.  constitutional frameworkz 
tho  so-called "Executive" - tho  independent  European  Commission1  of 
which  I  have  the  honour  to  b~ President;  the  Council  of national 
Ministers 1  which  is  tho  Community's  legislative bcdy;  the European 
Parliament,  which exercises  democratic  control  ovf3r  'tho  Commission; 
and tho  supreme  Court  of Justice. 
Boca.uso  this is of'-ven  misunderstood;  I  should like tc sa.y  a  little 
more  about  the  Commission.  Essentially, it has  three main  tasks. 
Our  first task is ono  of :lni  tia.t:!.vo  - to lrork  out  polioy :proposals 
for  the whole  Community.  To  help  us,  there is the Economic  and Social 
Committee,  ono  ~tmde·od and one  ropresont~t.ivos of industry,  business, 
labour,  tho professions,  and  consumer  organizations.  Wa  are obliged 
to consult it  1  a.s  wo:.l  a.s  consulting the  Eu1•opoan  Parliament,  in tho 
process  of f'ormule.t'lng  policy.  We  also consult  oxpert3 from  the 
national  Gov&rnmcnts,  as well  as  other pooplo  from  all walks  of life. 
In fact,  on  any workinb  day~  ono  can  sao  half a  dozen  such meetings 
announced  on  •.m.r  notice board.  In  1961J  tho tote.l number  came  to 
over  a  thousl'..nd,  So,  altho~h our building is facod with white  stone, 
it ca.n  hardly be  called an  ivory to'l4'er. 
Our  second task,  once  we  have  made  proposals to the  Council,  is 
to defend them  in its m&etings  - tc  defend what  might  bo  called "the 
Community  intorest" au  distinct  from  the  separate national interests 
of  the Member  States.  i'io  have  no  aotua.l vote  in tho  Council,  but we - 4  - 4937/X/63-E 
havo  a  virtual vote  there  since as  a  rule majority deoioions  by tha 
Co·unoil  ;u•o  only possible;  when  it ls aceepting  H.  proposal  from  tho 
Commission,  So  the  Commission  acts like a  kind of honest broker  -
not  so much  botweon  individ-ual national  Governments  as  betwoen  ·!;he 
national interests  and  ·cho  interest 0f tho  Commu.'¥\i ty as  a  "'rhola, 
Tho  Comu1ieeion' s  third task is to  de!'end  the  Commun.~ty .Lnterest 
in a  still more  positive 'I'Tay  - by ·:>ringing·  any  infringements of ·che 
Common  Ma.rket  'I'roa.ty before  the  Court  of  Justice~  In that sense,  it 
is tho watchdog of the  '!'rea  ty.  So  :far,  only somo  half a  dozen  oases 
have  llad to  go  as far as  the  Court J  and although wo  have  no·t  yet lost 
a  oase  against  a  national  Govornman~, it is worth noting  tha~ wo  oan be 
sued there  too. 
So  the  vommission is subject  to  judicial control&  but it is also, 
finally,  subjec·t  to  a.  possible vete. of no  confidence  on  the part of 
the European Ps.rliamont.  Cloarly  7  we  ce.nnot  be  answerP.bl~ to national 
l?arlierr:ents,  since we  are  a  Community  body:  ~1or  oan  we~  be  subordinate 
to the  Counoil cf Ministers,  whoso  members  are  themselves  subject to 
the national contr0l  of their own  Parliaments at home.  That  iG  why  we 
need  and welcome  tho  scrutiny of  the  European parlinmontariane1  although 
I  personally believe that  the powne  of the Parliament  over  the 
Commm1ity 1 s  workings  ough-t  to bo  incrose:oa.,  and will have  to· bo 
increased  a.E  the process of uniting ~uro:po goeos  on.  This,  ind.eed,  is 
one  of  the  waya  ~n which  Groat  Britain, with her centuries-old e:z:perienoe 
of true  democracy;  could make  a  specit'io  oon·~ri't:>Ution to th6  Community, 
For,  just beoauaA  the  Community  is not  a  new  coalition of States,  Hn 
progressive unity has  "Cv  "oe  firmly rootod  j.n  the  c.emooratio life of 
its whole  poyulatil)n  .. 
How  far has  tho  Community  gono,  and what  are its immetl.ia.te 
prospects? 
In the field of  the  customs  union,  as  you know,  lf9  have  now  out 
the tariffs between the Member  States by  some  50%:  and  on  July 1  ·this 
year  Wl!l  shall reach 6o%.  We  l1avo  made  tha first rapproahement  of 
national external tariffs,  and  in July7  again,  we  shall have  set in 
place two-thirds  of  tho  common  extornal tariff which is replacing 
them,  Industrial  ~uotas have  almost  disappeared,  both inside the ·- 5  - 4937 /X/63-E 
Community  and  vis--0.-v:l.s  tho  J'est  of the wvrld,  J:n  the field of economic 
union,  we  have  made  thfl  first vainful  steps toi'rards  our  oommon 
a.gricul  tural policy,  ''~'"  :·u1.,re  srwn  the  fir:3t  mcao'.lres  of liberalization 
for  ca.pi tal and  labour,  '.i'C  ha·ro  started to  move  to"'iards  othor  common 
policit:s,  anc1.  l'TO  aro  'busy processing tho  .firot  ,l.:pplications  :Lor  immunity 
from  thn  Common  Market 13  anti-trust pro•,·isions,  Sinco  1957,  the 
Community  g:ross  n.1. tiona:<.  :prodv.ct  1lt'ls  i.1croasod by  28%,  and  1 ts 
indust:.:-ial pruduc'tlcn  b-y  svmc  40"/o~  Trude  w:..thin  the  Community1  accord-
ing to  tho  latest forecasts,  ':·rill  very  soon have  dou.'blecl  since  the 
Common  Market  bogan;  <l'"d  thA.;.'lks  partly to  ~Jur  greater prospori  ty, 
ancl  partly to  the  ou.tg  in  tho  e:x:tornal  tariff which  we  have  already 
mado,  our  importf:>  from  the rost  .)'!"  tho  world have  gone  up  'by  a 'bout 
forty per  ce;.1t,  nearly  twic~ a.e  f8.st  as  tho  total increase  of world 
trad6. 
But it 'irol1ld  bo  dishonest,  of course,  to pretend that  ev-erything 
in tho  garden was  1 ')YOl;}'.  (~no  nffoct  of  th0  'breakdown  of  +he 
neeotiationa w:l.th  Bri-~ain,  :l..n  r'aot  ..  Has  c.  severe  blow  ta the  Community 
itself.  No  responsible person,  I  think,  would  sug~est that because 
British membership  or  -the  8orr.rnol1  Ha.rk0t  has  boon  postponed  the 
Community  shoulr.  oo:1o  to  "  hE'l t.  ThorG  wcu::i.d  oc  no  po:tn·~  for Br-itain 
in  look:!.nR  towarcl.s  futuro  membership  if ...,he  Comnuni ty wore  not  8.  going 
concern~  and if it 1-rerc  n.)t,  moroovor  ~  this  ·.~:::uld.  bo  a  vory sevore 
setback to tho  cntiro  ~ester~ world. 
Fortunatel;r,  tho  fears  't~1c..t  ma'1y  pecpl0  fol  t  in tho  onrly months 
of this  ya~::r  [Lr.;,  now  on  ·i:;ho  vTaJ  tr'l  being rer.w•rod.  It is a.l1·rays 
dangerous  "to  p:.:-c:phosy~  but  ·JUT'  l!i:lrnllor  s~ a.tos;,  whj_J.e  st:Ul disagreeing 
profoundly about  th8  l1rJ.tisr.  caoo  <:Plcl  avon  about  tho  philosophy of 
how  "European unity"  flhou:.cl  bo  closcribwd1  ha·v·o  alroa.J.y  shown  that 
fui·ther progross is not  only lJOssL ble  but  <':lVOn  :!.n  some  senses 
inevitable  ..  On  April  2,  the  Council  confl.cmoG.  t:1.•J  tai·iff measures 
which are  due  on  JuJ.y  1~  so  the  customs  anion  is going forward. 
My  own  'belief is that this fact  alono ;;ill 'J.,_timately  onsuro  that 
economic  union  accompanies it;  a.nd.  early this r.1on·i;h sin  a  mooting 
of our Council  of Ministere  wu  agrood  on  part  of  a  short-term action 
programme  recently put  r'o!'vrn.:>:'rl  to  cov<'lr  tho  current year.  Wo  have 
had  setbacks  ·ooforo,  and  wo  shall  havl3  thorn  agl'.in~  But  tho  movement 
is too  'bie  a  thing to  bo  permanently arrested.  \·Thy  thifl  is so1 
a.nd  wha.t  it means  for  Gr3at  Br:!.tain,  oaYl  be  soon  by  a  glanoe  at 
the past, - 6  .•  4937/X/63-E 
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Fundamentally,  the  Common  Market  represents  the  decisive 
rejection  of  ~wo  se~arate but  cogn~t£ beliefs.  The  first was 
the belief in  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  nation-state:  the 
second  was  the  belief in the  European  balance  of  power.  Both 
have  been  denied  by  ~vents, 
"Events"  in  perhaps  n  mild  word  to  describe:  two  World  War3 
•  and  the  killing,  destruction,  and  human  misery  that  went  with  them. 
Even  before  World  War  I,  indeed,  the  Austinian  concept  of 
sovereignty  was  under  fire,  not  only  from  political theorists,  but 
also  from  technological  progress  which  hastened  communications, 
shortened distances,  enlnrged  the  scale  of nodern  industry,  and 
made  much  of  our  pnlitic~l thinking anachronistic.  This  same 
progress,  by  increasing  out  of  all recognition  men's  power  of 
mutual  destruction,  made  the  consequences  of  any  breakdown  in  the 
balance  of  power  not  only  gr~vc but  catastrophic. 
Th<::  countrL:!s  of  '.~/estern  Europe 1  linked by  cor.unon  traditions 
and  common  hL:;torical  0xperience,  Ner:e  among  the  first  to  recognize 
these  fc..cts.  In  two  World  W:.1.rs  Wt'  <>mv  with  oux·  own  eyes  - and 
felt in  our  own  hearts  - th0  consequences  of  past mistakes.  After 
World  War  II,  at lant,  wo  sought  to  repair  the~.  The  slow  and 
painful history  of  European  integr~tion is itself the  proof  of  how 
difficult that  process  was  'lnd is,  But it was  still r.10re  difficult, 
if I  may  say  so,  for  a  country like Great  Britai~,  and  this  for 
reasons  which  arE:  entirely understandnbl.;  :1nd  hon0urable. 
Historians  of  the  ~ove~ont towards  :uropoan  ~nity have 
enum~rated a  number  cf  factors  in its pre-history.  They  include 
the  influence  of  the  classical world,  o.nd  especi.'llly  of Roman  law, 
and  its later runalgc.mation  with  Germanic  cle::tents;  the  imprint  of 
Christianity,  n.nd  the  unity  achieved by  the medieval  Empire  and 
the  Papacy,  and  the  Reformation;  the  sense  of  solidarity  embodied 
in the crusades; 
cedieval unity; 
the  feeling  of nostalgia,  often cisguided,  for 
thE:  K~ntian longing  f~r perpetual peace,  itself 
a  perpetual aspiration;  the  effects  of  cosuopolitan culture, 
especially in the  eighteenth  century;  the  uxample  of  the  United 
States in  the  New  World;  the  administrativt::  effects  of  Napoleon's - '7  - 4937/X/63-E 
conquests;  the  colouring  gi,ren  by  the  Romantic  uov~1Jcnt;  the  growth 
of international Socialise,  tradc-unionisr:  and  continental federalism. 
All  these,  it is true,  were  shared in  n&ny  respects  by  Great 
Britain:  but in  ~ccD  ~h~n  tra~el was  still nore  difficult  than 
today,  the  English  Channel  was  n  still more  forl!liclable  barrier,  and 
Great  Brit~in was  perhaps  Darginally l0ss  influenced by  some  of  the 
common  exp;;:rienccs which  ':J.ff.(;cted  c ontin  .. mtal Europeans.  As  a  sea 
power,  r:torcov0r,  ht..r  !:l.::ttcrial  history  was  di t'fcrent,  nnd  her 
overseas  dep~ndencies were  both  nore  ~xt~nsive and  more  concentrated 
in  temperate  zones  than  those  of  her r.ontinental  neighbours.  Even 
as  late as  the  two  World  Wars,  the  Channel  was  still a  vital part  of 
her  defences:  it saved her,  not  froo  the  appalling destruction  of 
aerial bombardoent,  but  at least  from  physical invasion  ~nd 
occupation!  and  by  a  sombre  paradox,  that  very  fact 1  which  enabled 
Britain in 1940  to  stand  alone  in Europe  against  the  forces  of 
tyranny  and  hence  to  pl~y a  m~jor role  in Europe's  liberation,  was 
one  reason  why  in  tho  inunedi.:tte  post-war  yectrc  she  felt  unable  to 
commit  hers0lf as  fully  as  did  continental  Europeans  tG  the  drivb 
towards  unity which  was  the  sole  surL  safeguard  against  a  further 
European  civil war. 
I  am  not  tryi~[ to  suggest  thu.t  Greet  Britain  somehow  needud 
to  suffer  the  same  national  humiJ.iation  nnd  ruin  that  h.::td  almost 
destroyed  the  Ccntinent.  Thos~ of  us  who  are  alive  today  can  only 
be  grateful  that  Lhe  did  not.  Nor  at:J  I  suggesting that Britain's 
special  traditions  or  her  world-wide  co~nitnents and  interests 
disqualified  her,  then  or  now,  Irom  ah~ring in  thu  work  which  we 
have  in hand. 
All  that  I  am  sayinc is  that  th0ec  facts,  quite  n~turally, 
!!lade  it still more  difficult  for  Britain  to  adjust  her  traditional 
policies  to  the  new  situation.  In  past  ages  she  had  played  a 
valuable  and  essential  role  in helping  to  maintain  a  balance  of 
power  on  the  Contin0nt.  In  the  two  wars  she  snw  the  concept  of 
national  sov8reignty vindicated,  not  denied.  And  it was  only 
gradually,  with  the  emergence  of  a  single  new  entity  on  the 
Continent  and  the  progressive  erosion  of national  sovereignty  by 
de  facto  interdependence  in  a  world  divided into  two  ~reat power-
blocs,  that public  opinion  in Britain,  ~G it h~d on  the  Continent, - 8  - 4937/X/63-E 
came  to  accept  the  new  facts  of international life.  That,  to  me, 
was  the  very  c~r..::1t:  significance:  of  th0  British Goverm:1ent 1 s  decision 
to  apply  for  «e~b~rship uf  the  Europcnn  Community;  and it is  a 
significance  which  in  my  v:i.vw  rem~cins  Ur1ch.:tng~;;d 1  just as  the  facts 
are  unchane;ed, 
III 
This  brings  Me,  finally 1  to  the  th~rd chapter  of  what  I  want 
to say  today.  What  is  the  future  for  the  Community,  and  what  does 
the  future  hold  for  Great  Britain  and  the  Community  together? 
First,  as  t;o  the  CoMmunity.  As  I  hnve  suggested,  the  new  facts 
of  international life  r:w.k·~  tho  future  growth  of  the  Colllr.lunity  an 
inevitabl~ phenomenon.  What  shape  will it take? 
In  the  n~terial field  of  econo~ic activity  I  think that  we  are 
bound  to  scu  a  closer knitting-together  of business  and  industry in 
Europe.  This  iB  already  taking  plnce.  Differences  of  languages 
and  tradition will  ensure,  [  think,  that it does  not  mean  uniformiza-
tion.  Indeed,  it is  on..:  uim  of  our  policies  to  prevent  just that. 
Our  anti-trust  and  c~mp0tit~on rules  in  p~rticular,  although  they 
may  seer~  cnoplex  ar.tl  8V8U  b'.lrclcn:.::;ouc  to  those  who  nre  as  yet 
unfamiliar  with  their  wr;rkine;s 1  will help  to  ensure  that  m~d±um and 
sm:1ll  industries  :1r0  n0t  sten11-rollcred  cut  c•f  existence  by  giant 
trusts.  1\.ocricn.n  expcrie;ncc,  .!lort)Over 1  sugr,ests  that  E:ven  in a 
cormon  r1nrkc:t  of  Am,;ri-::~<n  <limc:r:sions 1  wi tr.  one  language  and  a  fully 
integrated  8conomy,  scall  :1nd  mediuo-sized businesses  can  thrive 
alongside  the  giants. 
In  the  car.1e  w.-~y,  on  the  p0li  tlcal plctnc 1  I  do  not  myself believe 
that  the  Com:nuni ty  is 1:i.kcly  to  de,elop into  n  cen trnlized State  1 
<!Ven  in  tho  ver~  long  run,  Rather,  it is  a  fe~eration in  the  making. 
'i'o  so~e people,  I  know,  the  w·:rd  11f·cdera..Lism11  itself is comewh<:.t 
forbidrling  - especiall~,  to  tllc;r_;e  w1-,c·se  poJ.itical  expcr.icnce  is 
chiefly thnt  of  a  fairly  centr&lizednation-statc.  But  to  those 
who  - like  the  Gerl"a.ns,  for  instance  - h:1ve  a  history  of  federal 
or~anization,  the  conc0p<:  is  far  r::ur·,)  flexible.  I  am  sometimes 
ar.~azed  to  reflect  how  great  <rc- the:  differenc.oo  in  tax  laws,  for 
oxa~ple,  between  the  cantons  of  S~itzerland or  even  the  States in - 9  - 4937/X/63-E 
North  America.  When  I  was  in India recentlyl  a  very  eminent  and 
experienced  states~an remarked  to  ~e that  al~ost nll nations 
include  federal  el~~ents;  and  on0  has  only  to  think  of  the  British 
education~!  systc~ and  police  forc~s to  see  that  this is so.  Some 
things  are  pooled,  others  are  not:  so it will be  within  the  growing 
European  C om:nuni ty,  Unity in  di  vcrsi  ty is what  we  are  trying  to 
achieve. 
What,  finally,  will  be  the  Community's  own  posture  in  the 
international  field?  It vnll  not,  I  am  convinced,  be  a  so-called 
"third force"  - if by  that  t~rm is rr;.eant  an  irresponsible entity 
balancing  or  trying  to balance  between  East  and  West.  This is a 
noti~n which  no  single  member  Government  of  the  Community  has 
publicly  endorsed;  and it is  one  which  the  Qajority  of  our  citizens 
have  signified that  they  reject.  It is not  likely,  either,  to be 
dissolved  in  the  foreseeable  future  within  an  Atlantic  Community  -
if by  this  term is meant  an  Atlantic  entity cooparable  to  the 
federation-in-the-r.mking  that  we  :1re  struggling  to achieve  in Europe, 
The  reuf;on  why  is evident  when  one  tries  to  imagine  the  United 
States'  accepting  the  disciplines  of  the  Rome  Treaty,  which  even 
our  own  merJber  Govcrnncntssometimes  find  none  too  simple, 
What  the  Com~unity's true  role  in  the  world will be  is something 
more  complex:  but  before  I  return  to  that subject,  let me  in 
conclusion  say  a  littl~ narc  about its relations with Great  Britain, 
First,  in  the  economic  field.  Most  peoples  are  aware,  I  think, 
that  economic  consider~tions were  only  a  part  of  the  British Govern-
ment's  motives  in  seeking  Comnunity  membership;  und  many  people  in 
this  country  and  ~lsewhere have  pointed  out  that  the  postponement 
of British entry ia  far  from  being  the  economic  disaster  for  Great 
Britain that  so@c  night  have  feared.  Britain's  trade  with  the 
Community,  indeed  1  has  been  incre.1.sing  constantly:  last year  1  her 
exports  to it rose  to  the  record  figure  of $2,189 million,  register-
ing  a  trade  sur~lus of  over $200  million.  Particularly impressive 
export  3chievements  havn  been  registered  by  sane  of  Britain's staple 
industries,  such  as  aircraft,  plastics,  cheoicals in general, 
petroleum products,  ~gricultural machinery,  printing  machine~ and 
dooestic  electrical appliances  - tc  suy  nothing  of  the  growth  of 
the  tourist  trade,  With  push,  ~rive  qnrl  inagination,  I  myself - 10  - 4937/X/63-E 
believe  that British industry has little to  fear:  but if I  were 
allowed  to  make  a  su~gestion out  of  turn,  I  should  emphasize  what 
waa  stressed by  th~  reports  of  the  Export  Council  for  Europe  - that 
is,  that successful  .::xporting  t(J  tho  Cor.ununity  depends  upon  !'!!any 
more  thin~s  than  tariffs and  quotas. 
All  this,  of  course,  is in  the  purely  econooic  sphere  3nd  the 
purely interim stage.  Everyone  agreGs  - and  without  0xcoption, 
although  our  Member  st.:J.tes  tJ.lay  differ  on  the  Gubject  of  timine;!  -
that  the  door  to  future  British membership  of  tl<J.e  Comnunity  must  be 
kept  open.  On  the  practical  economic  level,  such  projFcts  aa  the 
Concorde  aircraft,  joint  space  r8scarch  and  even  the  Channel  tunn~l 
or  Channel  bridge,  ought  nat  to  be  underestimated;  and  there  may  be 
other  posGibilities  too,  But it is  equally  important  that  we 
should  avoid  any  avoidable  divergences  bet~cen our  economic  policies  -
and  our  political policies.  How  is  this  to  be  done? 
As  yet, it may  be  premature  to  speak  of  elaborate  interim 
arrangements.  Association,  for  exauple,  is  n  complex  and  difficult 
subject,  because it is so  ill-defined.  For  this  reason,  it might 
take  time  to  negotiate;  ~nd it iG  perfectly understandable  that 
there  should  be  reservations  about  thGt.  In  the  nore  iL~ediate 
future,  however,  there  seem  to  me  tc  be  two  ways  at least in which 
we  can  go  forwurct. 
The  first is procedural:  that is,  by  naintaining and  increasing 
our  mutual  contact.  On  this  occasion  I  should like  to  pay  a 
tribute  to  ffiY  old  friend Sir Arthur  Tandy,  who  since  th0  beginning 
has  so skilfully  nnd  ~ffectivcly led  the  British Delegation 
accredited  to  the  Comnunities  in  Brussels  and  Luxembourg.  It is  a 
real  personal  sorrow tc  see  him  leave  us:  but it is  a  groat 
pleasure  thnt  he  is here  today.  I  should  like also  to  extend  a 
welcome  to  his  successor,  Sir  Dougl.:1s  Wo.l·cer  O'Nelll,  who  is another 
old  friend  with  whom  I  look  forwar~ to  further  collaboration which 
I  am  sure  will  be  a<>  fruitful, 
It may  be  - and  I  very  ~uch hope  it wiJ.l  be  - that  we  shall be 
able  to  find  ways  of  intensifying  these  diplomatic  contacts,  so 
that both  parties  can  reciprocally influence  - although  not  of  course 
control  - each  other's policies.  But  there is  a  substantial side to the 
matter  as  well.  Thit3  is  what  I  meant  by  sayinrr  that  the  Community's - ll  -·  Lr937 /X/63-E 
posture  in  the  world  waa  connected with its  rel~tions with Great 
Britain. 
Tho  Driti~h neg0ti~tians tnught  us  all a  vary  grea~ deal.  Wd 
hnve  o.ll  coria  cut  of  th<;n  chanz>;er·.  r.1cn.  By  thie,  I  do  not  mean  that 
the  Community  was  prt.:vicusl~'  11inwo.rd-looking'1  ar.rl  ncederl  Britain  tr; 
teach  her  to  b8  11ulltW:J.rd-lcoking"  - :1ny  nr,ro  tl1Pcn  Britain needed  the 
Conmuni ty  to  put  an  Ulll  tr;  SC•!!le  suppo.sc:lly  "insu::J..o.r"  frane  of  :;1ind. 
What  I  mcnn  iro  tha':  tlh~  wh.:..l0  no:e:r;tiation  brought  us  fa.ce  to  face 
with  worl~ preble~~ which  in  cne  wn)  - jntellcctually - wo  already 
)mew.  The:  problems  r)f  the  H.Gi::m  Cot.1tt''!tweal th  '1'.'C  ona  GXar:tple.  VIe 
ourselves  arc  ulowly  developing something  which  iR  quite  new, 
somethint';  which  waa  unthoug.llt  of  when  the  Hnv:u:n.  Charter  and  the 
GATT  wert:  being neguti  -~t,'rl  - that is,  a  so-called  "development  policy" 
to  ::leal  wi  -clt  t!w  fearful  problt:nt>  oi  hnnger  and  poverty  in  the 
deifeloping  world.  The  British n0gotin.tion  forced  the  iGsue  upon  us 
in a  still ~ore  ina~diate  an~ practical  w~··  I  h~vc expressed  tho 
hope  elsewhere  that  the  solutions  to  one  part  of it which  we  t~en 
worked out- compretensiv8  t~~le  agre~ments with  India,  Pakistan 
and  Ceylon  - n~y be  E~intainud.  T~  do  so,  ~ni to  evolve  n  global 
policy,  W8  shall i\C,,d  to  ·.vor~-<;:  together  net.  only  with  the  Uni  'ted 
State;:;:  J.nd  othc!'  .::ountries  1  in  the'  A;;l.:1.ntic  Partnership  which  we 
seek,  but  also  witn  the  Cor~Jonwcalth and  with  Groat  Britain.  Who 
can  tBll  what  the  fur-chest  linits  of  such  co-up0ration  nay  be? 
What  is  true  of  dcvelop~ent  ~clicy is  true  of  other natters 
also.  At  p:-csent  we  nrc  pr0parir,g  for  th0  so-.e;a.llcd  11Ken11ed3•  round" 
of tariff negotiations:  could  we  not  achieve  sonc  degree  of 
:;o-ordini:!tion  of  Dri tish  nr,d  Community  atti  tudcc  here'/  Linkt:d  "'.,o 
this  qucGti  Jl1  i'l  th::~.t  of  .:1./)!'icul tur'll  policy,  particularly with 
r<.:gard  to  the  world-wid~.  comraociity  o.~;rcerlcnts  which  we  skctcheU.  out 
a:s  a  solution  to  smnu  •ll'  the  Ccn•:1onwea:th  prt.blPms  in the British 
talks,  Eerc  G.f,:J.in  there  n<J.y  be  scope  for  furthc:::·  work  toe;0ther. 
Finally,  or  pe~haps  no~ finully,  there  in  the  problem  of  ~on~tary 
co-ordination  - the  so-called "problen  of  world  liquidity":  can  we 
not  work  together  hero  too? 
•ro  :_,n.y  this is not  t.,  neglect  th~ internettionnl  bodies  that 
are  alraady  active  in  the  m~tt~r - the  OECD,  the  GATT  an1  the  IMF. 
But it is to  sugp;est  tho.t  .'Jrc)::tt  Britain and  tho  Conununity,  o.lthough 
they  are  •·c  prcs2nt  st~ll se:p:J.r:::.t,,cl.  oy  the  Cho.nucl,  way  find in SUMMARY  PROGRAMME  OF  THE  VISIT  TO  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
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